We extend the Brander-Taylor model of population and resource development in an isolated society by adding a resource subsistence requirement to people's preferences.
Introduction
Many societies that depend mainly on renewable natural resources have risen and then fallen over several centuries. Why they did this is a question that has long interested anthropologists, archaeologists and economic historians (see for example Tainter (1988) , Huntington (1917) ).
It has recently attracted attention from ecological-economic modellers, with the publication by Brander and Taylor (1998) (Ostrom, 1990) .
Recent developments of the BT model by Dalton and Coats (2000) , Erickson and Gowdy (2000) and Reuveny and Decker (2000) have explored various institutional adaptations that could have prevented, or at least ameliorated, overshoot and collapse. However, they did not consider why such adaptations did not occur, and in our further development of the BT model here, we do not try to answer the question directly either. (See Ostrom (2000) for a review of knowledge about the evolution of social norms, especially regarding resource management.) Our contribution comprises four new, explicit institutional adaptations, all of which can be viewed as resource conservation "policies", though in practice they would often not be enacted by formal governments, laws and courts; a subsistence requirement in the utility function; and a more general method of analysing the dynamic interaction of these two. We intend these methodological features to be relevant to civilization other than Easter Island, though we have not applied them empirically to any other cases.
The first new feature, a set of four resource conservation policies, comprises a tax, and quotas on total resource harvest, total (harvest) effort, and per capita effort. These are all explicitly defined as additional, collective actions. This departs from previous approaches in the literature, which have been just to make changes in the basic model specifications and/or parameters, and regard these as caused by some unspecified institutional change. Population control policies could be of interest too, but are not considered here.
Our second feature, a requirement in the typical utility function for a subsistence level of harvest, is shown to avoid the implausibility in previous literature that people are assumed to divide their time between harvesting and manufacturing in fixed proportions, no matter how scarce the resource is. ("Manufacturing" here mainly means statue erection and other monument building in the case of Easter Island, but more generally it means anything done with non-harvesting time, as labor is the sole modeled input to manufacturing.) The subsistence requirement is also shown to make the model less stable and more prone to overshoot and complete collapse. This better explains the complete stop in statue manufacturing believed to have happened on Easter Island after about 1500. More generally, it may help explain some of the many sudden collapses of past civilizations (1988) , and suggest a further reason why institutional adaptation often does not occur.
The importance of subsistence in economics is widely recognized (see Sharif (1986) for a survey). Its impact on growth patterns has been explored by authors such as Steger (2000) , but his and other analyses made more conventional assumptions than ours. Their productive capital stock was man-made rather than natural; instantaneous utility depended only on consumption;
the rate of population growth was exogenous; intertemporal rather than instantaneous utility was maximized; and the timescale of interest was much shorter than the many centuries we consider. We hope our analysis will lead to useful insights for contemporary development economics, but the challenge of bridging the paradigms is considerable.
Our third new feature is to investigate how an increased subsistence requirement makes it more difficult, under any of the four conservation policies, to avoid overshoot and collapse.
The technique typically used for such investigations would be simulation experiments, with just a few values of the subsistence parameter selected by trial and error. Instead, we use bifurcation analysis to show more rigorously how higher subsistence makes overshoot worse. This is accomplished by categorizing the types of long run development which occur for any combination of the subsistence parameter, and whatever parameter measures the strength of the institution.
Section 2 and the Appendix derive our theoretical results with both a subsistence level of resource, and the four conservation policies. Section 3 uses bifurcation analysis and numerical experiments to examine the effects of subsistence alone (with no institutional adaptation) on stability in general, and manufacturing in particular. Section 4 extends the bifurcation analysis to show that all four policies become less able to avoid overshoot and collapse as the subsistence parameter gets higher. Section 5 concludes.
2
Static and steady state analysis of subsistence, and of resource conservation policies 2.1 Static utility maximization, and the tax policy Without institutional adaptation, our closed, population-resource model is exactly the BT model, except that our representative consumer is assumed to have an instantaneous utility function of semi-Stone-Geary form,
where h and m are respectively individual consumptions of the resource good (that is, h is per capita harvest or nutrition), and of manufactures. Formally, "manufactures" in this model is the output from any time not spent harvesting. This includes more than just artifacts, such as stone statues or tools, that leave durable traces discoverable by archaeologists, and could include ritual and many other non-durable forms of culture. However, it is an acceptable approximation for our purposes to interpret archaeological evidence that the making of durable artifacts ceased at a given time, to imply that all non-harvesting activities ceased then too. The parameter h µ is a "utility subsistence level", or desired minimum level of resource consumption.
This was omitted by BT, who assumed u = h β m (1−β) . Adding subsistence to the utility function seems appropriate for modeling population collapse in the fairly primitive, resourcebased society represented by the Malthusian, nutrition-determined fertility function assumed by BT and recapitulated below. To some extent it also allows the idea of "subsistence stress" which appears frequently in Tainter (1988) to be captured. But as far as we know, minimum required levels of nutrition in both a utility function and a fertility function have not been combined before, and we will discuss in Section 2.3 how they might be interrelated.
Total resource harvest and manufactures consumption are respectively H = Lh and M = Lm, where L is the total population at any time (all time arguments are suppressed). Total manufactures M are produced with constant returns to scale using only labor, M = L M , where
time spent on resource harvesting, which we call total effort, using the familiar term from renewable resource economics; and
proportion of an individual's time spent harvesting. For all interior solutions, the manufactured good is taken as the numeraire (i.e. with price = 1) so that the wage rate w = 1; and with an individual's available time normalized at 1, total wage income per person is also 1. The (pre-tax) price of the resource in terms of manufactures is p.
One of our four, alternative, institutional departures from BT is that all resource consumption is taxed collectively at an ad valorem rate t, with the revenue being all returned to people as a lump-sum subsidy T . It is convenient to include this in the static analysis here, even though we do not look at its dynamic effect until Section 4. At each moment, the individual consumer myopically maximizes utility (1) subject to the budget constraint
while the condition for overall revenue neutrality (adhered to collectively, but not perceived by any individual) is
The resulting interior and corner solutions for per capita manufactures and resource consumptions (see Appendix for calculations) are respectively
As one would expect, the tax rate t shifts the balance of the interior solutions from resource consumption toward manufactures, but has no effect on the corner solution.
Next, following BT, we assume a Schaefer resource harvest function
where α is the harvestability parameter and S is the resource stock. Given open access, any rent (user cost) of the resource is ignored, and the price of the resource is just the value of labor expended per unit of resource harvested, which from ( 6) is:
(4) and (5) then become
When analysing quota policies later, we will also need the corresponding formula for total harvest when the tax rate t is zero, which we rearrange slightly to show as a weighted mean:
So if αS > h µ , the greater the subsistence requirement h µ , the more that harvest and effort exceed their Brander-Taylor levels.
Equations of motion, and steady states
As in BT, the resource carrying capacity of the society's land is K, the intrinsic rate of resource growth is r, and the rate of changeṠ of the resource stock is natural growth G(S) = rS(1−S/K)
The model is completed by assuming a population growth rate equal to a Malthusian fertility term proportional to per capita resource consumption, F (H, L) = φh, φ > 0, minus a base rate of decline. For neatness we write this as σ here rather than
Throughout we assume that the parameters satisfy BT's condition (13)
which guarantees the existence of steady state solution (with a positive population). We denote this and the corresponding steady state resource population as L ∞ and S ∞ , respectively. They are found by settingṠ =L = 0, though it is not necessarily a stable equilibrium, as we discuss below.
The Appendix shows that the steady state resource stock then depends on our new features t, the tax rate, and h µ , the subsistence level, according to:
1 Like BT, we do not distinguish between the effects of nutrition on birth rates (via fecundity and social customs) and on death rates (via disease and perhaps infanticide).
while the steady state population is
with per capita resource and manufactures consumption being respectively
With a little manipulation, equation (14) shows that provided σ φ > h µ , a positive resource tax will result in a higher steady state resource stock, while a positive subsistence requirement will have the opposite effect. From (14) and (15) the effect of an increased tax rate t on steady state population L is ambiguous: positive if S < K/2, but negative if S > K/2.
The steady state has another feature which we think has not been noticed in the context of an isolated, population-resource economy but deserves comment. The resource growth function G(S) = rS(1 − S/K) is an upturned parabola, symmetric about the level S = K/2 which gives the maximum sustainable harvest. So if S ∞ < K/2 -that is, if the steady state entails biological overharvesting (Clark (1990) , p27) -then the same or greater harvest, and hence population, can be sustained forever with a larger resource stock, as long as population can be kept in check rather than following a Malthusian dynamic. From (6) and (1), the larger stock means less effort is then needed, and more utility is enjoyed. The institutional adaptations considered in Section 4 will thus be able not only to stabilise development, but also to make people happier in the long run. To illustrate this phenomenon, when S ∞ < K/2 we will use the phrase "policy-constrained steady state", denoted by an asterisk, to mean the state with the maximum, larger stock that can sustain the same harvest and population as the steady state.
(For simplicity, we will consider it only when the tax rate is zero.) By symmetry, this maximum larger stock is
To stay in the policy-constrained steady state requires an appropriate check on per capita or
(The tax will also achieve a similar, but not identical, effect.) Any of these will prevent per capita harvest h rising above σ/φ, and thus population temporarily rising above L ∞ by (13).
Subsistence levels in the utility and fertility functions
From the fertility equation (12), population grows or falls as per capita harvest h is respectively greater or less than σ/φ. Since being able to reproduce oneself is arguably a basic need, we will sometimes call σ/φ the "fertility subsistence level". How does this relate to the "utility" subsistence requirement h µ in (1)? To what extent is each level biologically or socially determined?
There are non-trivial questions, and there is scope for further research here. It is tempting to suggest that h µ is the minimum nutrition needed to stay alive, while σ/φ is the nutrition needed for replacement fertility (and is viewed as such by BT, p128), so that h µ < σ/φ since one must be alive to have children, but not the other way around.
We are inclined to this interpretation ourselves, but one cannot be sure, as may be seen from the following alternative definitions of a subsistence consumption level in a utility function (from Steger (2000) , pp345-6):
1. "...a standard of living that allows for the satisfaction of the minimum (physical and mental) basic needs of life" 2. "...the least-cost requirement for sustaining an individual's dietary needs" 3. "...that amount of consumption which is a necessary prerequisite for sustaining life" Definitions (2) and (3) just relate to physical nutrition. However, by including "mental" needs, definition (1) suggests that the subsistence level may be subject to social as well as biological influences. Both food and children have social as well biological purposes, so we feel it is worth considering a range of h µ values in relation to σ/φ. However, values significantly above σ/φ do seem unlikely and are therefore of less practical interest. The implication of h µ > σ/φ is that people choose to put all their labor into harvesting at nutrition levels above those needed to maintain population. So one can guess that a stable population-resource equilibrium may then be impossible to achieve, since a falling population cannot coincide with restraint in harvest effort, and this is indeed what our analysis reveals. 3
Quota policies
In Section 4 we analyse the aims and dynamic effects of the tax policy defined in Section 2.1, and three (maximum) quota policies: H ≤H, a (constant) quota on total harvest; L H ≤L H , a quota on total effort; and l H ≤l H , a quota on per capita effort. These policies are chosen to provide variety compared to the existing literature, and because they roughly correspond to some of the customary restrictions on resource use observed in the anthropological literature. 4
In simple societies without formal governments and taxes, the tax could be thought of as a disincentive to "excessive" resource consumption enacted by social pressures, or possibly some kind of resource-sharing mechanism. The three quotas can likewise be thought of as social norms or taboos on harvest or effort. The information needed to set appropriate quota levels would probably be much more demanding for total rather than per capita levels, but this is a complication which we leave for further work. We give here just the formulae under each quota for total harvest H, which determines the coevolution of S and L in (11) and (12).
The formulae come from (10) by assuming that if any quota requires a per capita harvest less than the subsistence level h µ , then it is disobeyed, and either h µ , or the maximum possible level S if this is less than h µ , is consumed. 5 So with an intended quota of (for example)H on total harvest, its formal definition is instead max(H, h µ L), giving the following:
A quotaH on total harvest in total harvest:
A quotaL H on total effort results in total harvest:
A quotal H on per capita effort results in total harvest:
3 The effect of the subsistence requirement with no institutional adaptation, and the importance of bifurcation
The effect of the subsistence requirement
Here we are interested only in how the subsistence consumption level h µ affects the dynamics of the model, and allows for an abrupt disappearance of "manufactures" from a culture. We treat people as uncoordinated individuals, and so ignore the possibility of collective resource 5 Consideration of policies being disobeyed raises the question of enforcement costs. We investigated the effect of requiring a lump sum cost, in terms of time used for neither harvesting nor manufacturing, to enforce any conservation institution, but found that it made little difference and so added no extra insights. This may well not be true for a more complex and realistic treatment of enforcement costs, which remains an important topic for further research.
conservation, and set the tax rate t = 0 or ignore the effect of quotas in any formulae in Section 2.
The effect of the subsistence requirement is fairly easy to understand intuitively. BT's results follow directly from the above by setting h µ = 0, and thus ignoring all the corner solutions. In BT, no matter how low the resource S falls as a result of harvesting, and thus no matter how negative the population growth rate φβαS −σ (from (8) and (12) This means that if resources per person become scarce, population stops growing fairly quickly, putting less pressure on the resource.
However, for people to spend exactly the same proportion of their time on manufactures, no matter how well or poorly fed they or their children are, seems unlikely behavior. Our solutions (8) and (9) with h µ > 0 allow the more plausible reaction that as the resource stock S falls, labor is reallocated from the manufacturing to the resource sector. Once the stock falls below h µ /α, and hence the maximum per capita harvest falls below the consumption subsistence level h µ , manufacturing effort stops altogether. In an important sense, society has then "collapsed", and all human effort is spent on resource harvesting. Even before this, the greater preference for resources caused by h µ > 0 means that as resources per capita decline, population growth tails off less rapidly, harvesting pressure on the resource is greater, and the overshoot of population is greater, as we shall see. Given the number of fairly complete and rapid collapses of manufacturing observed in the archaeological record (Tainter (1988) , Ch. 1),
this feature of our model may be relevant to many ancient societies, not just Easter Island which we use as our case study.
As an illustration of the subsistence effect over time, consider Island over the period 400-1900 A.D., using the parameters in the first column of Table 1 .
Figure 1(B) shows the development of the same variables, and also total harvesting effort L H , for the same parameters, except that h µ = 0.015, which is 60% of the "fertility subsistence", rather than zero. Figure 1 (C) shows per capita harvesting effort l H and manufacturing effort m for both the BT and h µ = 0.015 cases. Note first, the earlier and much greater population overshoot (to about 16,000 rather than 10,000) which occurs "with subsistence"; second, the much more severe falls in population and resource stocks thereafter; and third, the complete halt in manufacturing which lasts from about 1150 till 1650, by which time the resource (but not yet population) has begun to recover. population, per capita and total harvest, and per capita and total effort, for both the BT case of h µ = 0 and our case of h µ = 0.015. Since S ∞ < K/2, in the latter we include values for the "policy-constrained" steady state described in Section 2.2. 
Long term dynamics, and bifurcation analysis
Subsistence also causes differences not just initially, but also in long-term stability behavior. Furthermore, when the subsistence level h µ rises above some threshold h † µ , which depends in a complex way on the parameters, the model behavior fundamentally changes, in a way that could matter for many applications of BT-like models. For h µ < h † µ , the steady state is a stable equilibrium in the (S, L) phase space, toward which the system will converge either monotonically or through a series of damped oscillations. For h µ > h † µ , the steady state is unstable and the system will converge to a limit cycle circling around the steady state. The transition between the two behaviors is known as a Hopf bifurcation (Kuznetsov, 1995) . In this case, the equilibrium point is unstable and the limit cycle emerges. Increasing h µ still further shifts the PN further left into the region where the RN becomes linear with a negative slope where again the equilibrium is stable as in 3b. However, the topological feature of the curved RN remains, generating severe overshoot and collapse dynamics.
the steady state is unstable and the model converges to a limit cycle. Because the value of h µ = 0.015 chosen for Figures 1(B) , 1(B), and 2 is rather close to h † µ , the real parts of the system eigenvalues are then quite close to zero, though still negative. So although the steady state is still stable, convergence is much slower than with h µ = 0, as shown by Figure 2 .
The transition from region 3a to region 3b is marked by a saddle-node of periodics bifurcation at h µ = h † † µ (= 0.02573), where the limit cycles become unstable. For h µ > h † † µ , the limit cycle behavior ceases and the model again converges (though very slowly) to a steady state. Figure   4 (B) illustrates all these behaviors with phase-plane diagrams, as explained in the figure caption.
However, though the division between regions 3a and 3b is mathematically interesting, it is not very meaningful because it occurs where h µ > σ/φ, which is less likely to occur in practice for reasons discussed in Section 2.3. So from now on we merge regions 3a and 3b into a single region 3, and what matters is that as a larger subsistence parameter takes the model further from region 2 into region 3, there will be increasingly severe overshoot and collapse behavior.
Before going on, note that our subsistence model can give a better fit than the BT model to what is known of Easter Island history, by using the parameters in the final column of Table 1 .
Some of these are the same as BT's, while others are "tweaked" but still plausible. The resulting simulation has the same peak population of about 10,000, but in about 1320 A.D. rather than BT's 1230, closer to the target date of 1400. It has a complete cessation of manufacturing in about 1500, in line with the archaeological evidence, whereas manufacturing in the BT model is still at about half its peak then. Finally, our population in 1774 is about 2500, closer to the 2000 estimated by Captain Cook's party than the BT figure of about 3200.
4 Analysis of institutional adaptations: How subsistence makes it harder to avoid overshoot
Types of institutional adaptation, and aim in studying them
Before giving our analysis of four variants of explicit institutional adaptation, we state briefly what other variants of adaptation have already been considered in the literature, and then in detail the motivation for studying this topic. In Reuveny and Decker (2000) , "population management reform" caused a parametric change in the fertility function. In Dalton and Coats (2000), "changes reflecting the nature of property rights over the resource" caused a parametric change in the degree to which the rate of resource stock growth leads to higher effort. In Erickson and Gowdy (2000) , where accumulated (but depreciating) human-made capital substitutes for nutrition in raising fertility, "caring for the future" and "an ethic of zero population growth" eliminated capital depreciation, and halved the effect of human-made capital on fertility. By contrast, our institutional adaptations -the ad valorem, revenue-neutral resource tax in (2) and (3), at a time-varying rate t described below, and constant quotasH on total harvest,L H on total (harvest) effort orl H on per capita effort, as defined by (18)- (20) respectively -are explicit policy mechanisms to conserve the resource stock, added as extra incentives or constraints on the model.
The common motivation is to see what kind of institutional adaptations make overshoot
and collapse of population less or more severe. But how should a society's interest in avoiding overshoot and collapse be defined? Koopmans (1977) emphasized that when population varies, as here, agreeing on a dynamic goal to determine society's choices over the course of history raises difficult questions. Is society's wellbeing at each time z seen as population L(z), per capita utility u(z), or total utility L(z)u(z)? And is society's goal at each time then to maximize current wellbeing, its long-run steady-state level, or its discounted present value? In a model with endogenous population growth over centuries, BT chose the maximization of current per capita utility as the goal, but in Steger's (2000) model with subsistence consumption and exogenous population growth over (presumably) decades, the goal was to maximize the present value of total utility.
In practice, society's dynamic goal will of course adapt over time under a complex set of influences: institutional adaptation is a gradual process. However, in common with existing literature, we do not explicitly analyse this process of adaptation, which remains as a considerable challenge for further work. In comparing our institutional adaptations, we adopt the following, we hope plausible, view of society's dynamic goal, even though it is by no means fully explained, and not a formal maximization. We assume society would like to know the minimum necessary action, for a given type of policy, to avoid overshoot. We look for the minimum, because stronger action tends to reduce steady state population, which is considered undesirable. We define "overshoot" to have been avoided if population peaks at no more than 15% above its long run steady state level. This was chosen because we found that any decline of less than about 15% from a peak takes place over a very long time, and therefore can be considered mild; and avoiding decline completely requires draconian policies which greatly reduce steady state population. And as stated earlier, we wish to determine whether an increased subsistence parameter h µ makes it harder to avoid overshoot.
An ad valorem resource tax
Given the problem of overshoot shown in Section 3, which all our four resource conservation policies aim to solve, any policy needs to be "switched on" not until well after the start of history, but before the resource stock S gets too small and the population L gets too large.
With quotas, this switching on is fairly automatic. With the tax, we could simply switch it on from some date onwards, but instead we choose an automatic mechanism to phase it in, by letting the tax rate depend inversely on the per capita resource stock S/L at any time according to the following formula:
where s ≡ S/L. The rationale behind (21) is that as the per capita resource stock decreases to some threshold, people start to take collective action to preserve it. Although the precise functional form of (21) is arbitrary, it is also very general, and any similar switching-on function would produce similar qualitative behavior. The parameters a and b can be chosen to produce a wide range of behaviors from the tax switching on immediately once s falls to the threshold a and then remaining at t max (equivalent to a constant tax), to a case where the tax is phased in gradually over time. For our standard Easter Island case, we used a = 5 and b = 3, which makes t/t max "turn on" from about 0.2 when s = 8, to about 0.8 when s falls to 3. Since the equilibrium value of s is 1.3, this parameter choice represents a relatively proactive population.
As an illustration, we show in Figure 4 than 6% above its steady state level of L ∞ = 2912, though the latter is 32% lower than with no tax. Moreover, the resource stock converges to a steady state level of 9762, which is above the policy-constrained level of 8000 shown in Table 1 . However, if t max is held constant but the subsistence requirement increased to h µ = 0.025, development follows a very different path, as shown by Figure 4 (B). Overshoot and collapse still occur, and in fact if the time axis is greatly extended, we would see that the system is stuck in a limit cycle. This supports, but in no way proves, our earlier suggestion that increased subsistence generally makes it much harder for institutional adaptation to prevent overshoot and collapse. However, we can do considerably more, by using bifurcation analysis to show exact ranges of subsistence values h µ in which our particular institutional adaptation, the ad valorem tax t, can or cannot prevent overshoot. This is done by exploiting the fact that the point at which the Hopf bifurcation occurs is a function of both h µ and t max . Using sophisticated bifurcation software, we computed the value h † µ (t max ) of the Hopf bifurcation point, first shown in Figure 4 with no tax, for any value of the maximum tax. The result is the solid line in Figure 5 , which we call a "policy analysis diagram" because it divides the (h µ , t max ) parameter space into regions where the tax policy has qualitatively different long run effects. At any point to the right of this bifurcation line (i.e. in region 3), the economy follows either a limit cycle (and hence no steady state), or (for even higher values of h µ ) very slow convergence to the steady state. 6 The dotted line to the left of the bifurcation line divides the region where moderate convergence to a steady state occurs into region 1 where (more than 15%) overshoot does not occur, and region 2 where it does. The parameter combinations (0.015,5) for Figure 4 Figure 5: Regions in h µ − t max parameter space with qualitatively different behavior. In region 1, institutional response will prevent overshoot and collapse. In region 2, the system will experience relatively mild overshoot and collapse and eventually converge to a steady state. In region 3, the system will experience increasingly severe overshoot and collapse as h µ increases. The system will either oscillate perpetually or converge to the steady state relatively slowly. The two crosses mark the parameter combinations used for Figures 4(A) and (B).
The positive slope of both lines shows the destabilizing effect of an increased subsistence requirement h µ on the system, as follows: 
A quota on total harvest
The instantaneous effect of a quotaH (constant over time) on total harvest H was given by (18). To make a general analysis of the dynamic effects of this policy, we go straight to the policy analysis diagram for this policy, still using the same BT parameters from Table 1 . In Figure 6 , the space spanned by the subsistence requirement h µ and the quotaH falls into the same three areas as Figure 5 , but with very different shapes. In region 1, institutional response will prevent overshoot and collapse. In region 2, the system will experience relatively mild overshoot and collapse and eventually converge to a steady state. In region 3, the system will experience increasingly severe overshoot and collapse as h µ increases. The system will either oscillate perpetually or converge to the steady state relatively slowly. The two crosses mark the parameter combinations used for Figures 7(A) and (B).
Owing to the three inequality constraints (the quota itself, the rule for disobeying the quota, and the corner effect of the subsistence requirement) built into Figure 6 , the explanation of these shapes is quite complex and only moderately insightful. So it is omitted, but is available from the authors. Here we just note that a rising subsistence parameter h µ makes overshoot harder to avoid, as follows. (Note that the policy-free case is beyond the top of Figure 6 -a quotaH so high that it has no effect -rather than at the bottom of Figure 5 , a zero tax.) (a) For 0 < h µ < h † µ , the harvest quota can avoid overshoot, but it has to become tighter (i.e.
lower) as h µ increases, giving the downward sloping line between regions 1 and 2.
(b) For h † µ < h µ < σ/φ, a quota ofH < 120 will change the model's long run behavior from a limit cycle to no overshoot.
(c) For σ/φ < h µ , no quota can prevent overshoot, mainly because it will be disobeyed if it implies a per capita harvest below h µ .
As an illustration, Figure 7 shows the historical development of total resource stock, population and manufacturing for the parameter combinations (h µ ,H) = (0.015,106.7) and (0.03,106.7), which fall respectively in regions 1 and 3 of Figure 6 . Figure 7 is thus comparable to the development histories shown in Figure 4 for the resource tax. In addition we have shown by the bold solid line when the quota actually binds. In Figure ( A), the quota binds forever from about 700 A.D onwards. The resulting steady state, which is reached with no overshoot at all, has a resource stock equal to the policy-constrained value in (17), of S * = 8000. It has a population equal to the no-adaptation value in (15) 
Quotas on total effort and per capita effort
The effect of a quota on total (harvest) effort, as defined in (19), is shown in the corresponding policy analysis diagram, Figure 8 . It is similar to Figure 6 in that the quota has an "onoff" nature. Further explanations of the region boundaries are available from the authors.
Illustrations of dynamic behavior for parameter combinations in regions 1, 2 and 3 are not radically different from the case of a total harvest quota, and so are not given.
The policy of a quota on per capita (harvest) effort, l H ≤l H as defined in (20) In region 1, institutional response will prevent overshoot and collapse. In region 2, the system will experience relatively mild overshoot and collapse and eventually converge to a steady state. In region 3, the system will experience increasingly severe overshoot and collapse as h µ increases. The system will either oscillate perpetually or converge to the steady state relatively slowly.
proof). First, if h µ = 0, recall that for BT parameters, l = 0.4 always. So in the BT model, a quotal H > 0.4 has no effect, and thus will not prevent overshoot. If h µ > 0, it turns out that a quotal H > 0.4 will not prevent overshoot either, for the crucial reason that once the quota requires a per capita harvest h < h µ , it is disobeyed. So like the case with no institutional adaptation, h µ > 0 simply makes overshoot more severe. Forl H < 0.4, control of harvest effort is so severe from the start that the subsistence requirement turns out never to bite. Such a society is so disciplined that individuals put the common good before individual utility from the start. Thus, a broad pattern emerges that quotas prevent overshoot only when they are draconian, and then their effect is rather obvious.
Conclusions
We have made three additions to Brander and Taylor's (1998) model of an isolated, myopic, Malthusian human society which depends solely on a renewable natural resource with a finite carrying capacity, where population is inherently capable of overshoot and collapse. First, adding a minimum subsistence level of resource consumption allows the proportion of time spent resource harvesting to vary with resource scarcity, including the corner solution where all time is spent harvesting. This is consistent with the sudden and complete disappearance of "manufacturing" (non-harvesting activities such as monument-building which produce durable remains) which has often been observed in the historical record, and which happened when the famous, giant stone statues were no longer made on Easter Island after about 1500 A.D. More generally, subsistence destabilizes development, because it results in a less effective response to declining resources: people try to maintain their resource consumption, rather than allowing population to decline faster, so overshoot and collapse becomes more severe. We suggested that the subsistence level should be less than the implicit subsistence level required for population stability, but this may repay further investigation.
Second, we explored four forms of institutional adaptation to prevent overshoot and collapse:
a time-varying, ad valorem tax on resource use, and constant quotas on total harvest, total (harvest) effort, or per capita effort. Each of these resource conservation policies is intended to avoid a population overshoot of more than 15% above a steady state value, and was defined as an explicit collective mechanism, rather than as a change in basic model dynamics or parameters.
We chose a rule that all quotas were disobeyed once consumption is below the subsistence level. This has a big effect on dynamics for high subsistence levels, and identifies the cost of informing and enforcing various quota levels as a significant issue for further work. Broadly, quotas prevent overshoot only when they are draconian, and then their effect is rather obvious.
Our third innovation was to analyse the long run dynamic effects of any combination of subsistence level and conservation policy, by using bifurcation analysis combined with numerical experiments. The resulting policy analysis diagrams show how a higher subsistence requirement fundamentally destabilizes development. Either a stronger policy is needed to prevent overshoot, or for the highest level of subsistence requirement, no policy can prevent overshoot, and a limit cycle of perpetual overshoot and collapse is often the result. However, a bonus stemming from the logistic resource growth function assumed is that resource conservation policies can increase steady state utility without reducing steady state population, by preventing biological overharvesting.
Determining to what extent such theoretical predictions can explain why known past civilizations experienced just one, or many, cycles of overshoot and severe or complete collapse, is a large task remaining for further work. Since cycle times can have an order of magnitude of a thousand years, distinguishing an oscillation converging to a steady state from one converging to a limit cycle would not be easy. Another large question also remains unanswered: why or why not have various institutional adaptations been adopted? How do societies evolve institutions which set some long term goal, instead of instantaneous utility maximization, for harvesting decisions? Though we have not directly tackled this, our demonstration that a subsistence requirement makes long-term management of renewable resources more difficult suggests that ignoring subsistence may lead to misleading analysis of institutional evolution, and ineffective policy proposals. Many other model developments -time-varying quotas, population controls, accumulation of monuments, irreversibility of resource exhaustion, and so on -are possible and interesting, but we suggest that including subsistence, and using bifurcation techniques of dynamic analysis, are innovations worth repeating for this type of ecological-economic modeling.
A Appendix: Instantaneous Utility Maximisation, and Steady States A.1 Consumer optimization
To derive results (4) for h and (5) for m from the constrained optimization problem defined by
(1), (2) and (3), define the Lagrangian
First order conditions for an interior solution are:
(2) and (3) ⇒ m = 1 − ph
(24) and (25)
(23) and (26) 
which after routine algebra gives (4) and then (5). Since a negative amount of manufactures is physically impossible, the condition for this interior solution to apply is
If (28) does not hold, then a corner solution (in which the tax rate plays no part) applies instead:
A.2 Steady state
To derive the steady state for S in (14), L in (15), h and m in (16) corresponding to the first value of S ∞ (t, h µ ) in (14), settingL = 0 in (12) gives h immediately. Using (8) then gives
⇒ αS − h µ = (1 + t − βt)(
from which (14) and (15) follow by straightforward algebra, including settingṠ = 0 in (11) (with no check if the resulting steady state is stable). Next, 
